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I – INTRODUCTION 
 As for the field of economics, nineteenth-century liberal
1
 French economists had the same 
primary preoccupation as their British counterparts: the defense of political economy against 
accusations of materialism, impassivity and indifference to the plight of the masses (see De Marchi, 
1974: 123-35)
2
. Many of these economists were worried about what Cairnes qualified as the 
―repugnance and even violent opposition‖ of the working class towards the ideas of political economy 
(White, 1996: 115). This preoccupation was even stronger in France where socialist movements were 
large and quite active. The desire to defend their ideas was manifest in their search for a philosophy 
that would underpin the economic sciences, specifically one that would demonstrate that political 
economy was not only concerned with utility, but also with justice, and that utility ―is, in the end, 
always in harmony with that which is just‖ (Molinari, 1863: 31). To do so, the vast majority of French 
liberals, starting with Blanqui, rejected the ―British School‖ of political economy in order to develop a 
―French School‖, which they felt was more ―humanitarian‖ because it was more concerned with the 
question of distribution of wealth. Thus, at the core of most 19
th
 century French liberal works can be 
found the traditional distinction that Halévy (1901-04: 6) made between ―a legal and spiritual 
philosophy of human rights‖ in France and ―a utilitarian philosophy of personal interest‖ in England. 
Indeed, French liberals refused the utilitarianism that they felt characterized the British school because 
they judged utilitarianism incapable of providing a proper conception of justice. For this reason, they 
looked to natural law as the foundation of their economic theory, which they considered to be a branch 
of moral philosophy. 
 The objective of this article is to examine the manner in which 19
th
 century liberal economists 
in France created and wove the threads between political economy and moral philosophy in order to 
show how doing so influenced their economic analysis—and not just their ideological positions—on 
the issue of the coordination of interests. Though focused on the analysis of liberal 19
th
 century French 
economists, this article excludes Jean-Baptiste Say, instead considering only the period after his death, 
which marked the beginning of what Le Van Lesmelle (2004: 79 and f.) has qualified as the ―liberal 
lobby‖. This lobby dominated the French scene3, at least during the last two thirds of the century, with 
 3 
authors defending remarkably motionless ideas: as noted by Breton (1985:251), ―deprived of the 
analytical spirit and theories put forward by others with genius, the economists produced pure 
propaganda and true popularization; they oriented French political economy towards too institutional 
paths. In these economists [...] any scientific effort had disappeared. With them, political economy had 
come to a standstill.‖ Ignoring the so-called marginalist revolution (Breton, 1998), they went on 
battling with the Classical school, in spite of its decline
4
: their positions were most of all determined 
by the fear of socialism. This fear, but also the opposition to ―conservative‖ parties asking for 
government intervention in favour of ―those who find themselves affluent‖ (Clément, 1853: xii), led 
these economists to unite their efforts to spread ―economic truths‖ (ibid.: xvi), considering that ―the 
more light is spread, the more people will judge that the most powerful auxiliary of the morale is 
political economy‖ (Droz, 1846: 3). These are the stakes behind the founding of the Guillaumin 
publishing house in 1835, the creation of the Journal des économistes in 1841, and the appearance of 
Dictionnaire d’économie politique in 1852. The principal contributors to these various publications, 
and to the publications of the Guillaumin publishing house in general, are at the center of this study. 
However, these liberal authors did not form a homogenous group with well-defined boundaries, and 
thus the ideas that they defended varied from one author to the next, even varying within the writings 
of a single author. Nonetheless, as Breton and Lutfalla (1991: 590-1) have shown, these 19
th
 century 
authors agreed on a certain number of common positions, in particular on ―the necessity of a good 
institutional environment‖ and the rejection of ―abstract reasoning‖5. As will be shown in this article, 
these two common positions are fundamental to understanding their stance on justice and utility, and 
contributed to their perspective on utilitarianism. In spite of their differences (not always easy to 
ascertain), French liberal economists united around two issues. At one level, they stressed the human 
character of their discipline: political economy could not be separated from the morale. British 
economists were then blamed for reducing economic activity to material relations between 
commodities, and their conclusions were rejected as false because they overemphasized self-interest 
and neglect individual responsibility (II). At another level, French liberal economists were obsessed by 
the legitimization of property, which, according to them, should not be rooted in positive laws, always 
exposed to the arbitrariness of the State, but in unquestionable natural rights. Here, they mostly 
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rejected socialist doctrines, where the alleged search for the fulfillment of collective interest was the 
disguise for arbitrariness and tyranny (III). 
The first level suggests the possibility of finding in these authors a genuine positive conception of the 
economy, based on a distinct method of analysis and rooted in moral philosophy. But the second level 
raises the suspicion that this approach only reflected French liberal‘s political fear of social disorder. 
Their arguments bear witness to their fear of a challenge to the social order, and colored their 
perceptions on the rise of socialism: the absence of any consideration of what would come to be called 
―social issues‖ in the British School of political economy was assumed by some to have encouraged 
the rise of socialism
6
, but for others, notably the authors who defended the idea of property rights 
based on natural law, it was the rejection of any reference to ―natural law‖ that led to the rise of this 
movement.  
 
II – WHEN STRESSING SELF-INTEREST LEADS TO ERROR  
 Although the distinction between the two schools of political economy described above seems 
to appear for the first time in the writings of Sismondi (see Arena, 2001), its spread among French 
liberals followed the 1837 publication of Adolphe Blanqui's Histoire de l’économie politique en 
Europe depuis les anciens jusqu’à nos jours. Actually, Blanqui, who was the first author to write a 
« book in history of economic thought worthy of name » (Arena, 1991b : 176) holds a specific place 
among French liberals, who increasingly sought to distance themselves from his positions that they 
felt too close to the socialists‘ (ibid.: 183), but his distinction between the two schools remained a 
recurring theme in most economic works of the time
7
, and in 1854 was the subject of a debate at the 
Societé d'Economie Politique
8
. Two other themes were hidden behind this distinction: one concerning 
the relationship between the economy and moral philosophy, which the British school was accused of 
neglecting (§.1), and the other concerning individual responsibility (§.2).  
 
 §.1) There was great consensus among 19
th
 century French liberals that economic science was 
a ―moral science‖, to the point where a discussion of this subject appears to have been a compulsory 
passage in all of their work. This subject was debated several times at the Societé d'Economie 
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Politique and appeared in diverse articles published in the Journal des Economistes. In addition, a 
competition at the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1858 awarded honors to works by 
Baudrillart, Rondelet and Dameth. This relationship between the economy and the morale (i.e., the 
science of duty that determines justice) is seen by 19
th
 century French liberals from a triple 
perspective
9
.  
 First of all, these liberals did not agree that seeking wealth resulted in a reduction in the 
morality of the agents. On the contrary, they thought that amassing more wealth could only be 
accomplished if the agents cultivated behavior that conformed to the rules of moral conduct. Thus, 
according to Clavet (1868: 239), ―wealth is far from being a cause of de-moralization [i.e., corruption], 
because it can only be acquired at the price of continual sacrifice of our vices and our passions‖. In 
fact, for Passy (1845a: 50), ―the populations' insufficiency of intellectual and moral force‖ constituted 
the principal cause of their suffering. Hence, during a discussion of Ireland at the Société d’Economie 
Politique, the participants considered almost unanimously that ―the principal causes of the misfortunes 
of Ireland […] lie in the character of the Irish people who, in general, are not industrious, and worse, 
are lazy and improvident‖ (Garnier, in Société d’Economie Politique, 1866a: 130). More generally, 
since the economic development of a country implied exchanges between individuals, trust between 
individuals was a necessity.  For Chevalier (1868: 13), ―the acts though which society and individuals 
gain wealth suppose, in order to perpetuate and develop in a country, a satisfactory moral situation in 
itself; […] cutting off society from good faith and honor in business would, in and of itself, burden the 
transactions with difficulties, making them impossible, and thus drying up production, the primary 
source of wealth‖.  
This pacification of social relations was not only perceptible at the national level, but also at 
the international level. For liberals, political economic theory was proof of ―the solidarity that unites 
the interests of diverse parts of humanity […] by highlighting the absurdity of hatred and national 
rivalries‖ (Clément, 1853: xxiii), and the economic sciences were revealed to be ―the best auxiliary of 
the morale‖ (Baudrillart, 1857a: 23; see also Droz, 1846: 3; Garnier, 1878: 273) ―by furnishing a solid 
basis for the appreciation of a great number of sentiments, actions, and customs that the prejudiced had 
classified incorrectly‖ (Clément, 1853: xxiii). Thus, economic theory was considered to provide the 
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―means […] for correctly appreciating the relative merit of the different uses that can be made of 
wealth‖ (ibid.). For example, 19th century liberal economists, acting on their conception of the 
economy, rejected sumptuous expenditures, by showing that such expenditures only constituted a 
waste of resources, an unproductive expense that impoverished the society
10. They criticized ―legal 
charity‖, which aping the English poor laws, ―encourage laziness and carelessness and […] demoralize 
the poor‖ (Garnier, 1846: 311); they also defended inheritance rights, which extend ―ideas of 
precaution and the sentiments of affection and devotion‖ (Courcelle-Seneuil, 1842: 778; see also 
Baudrillart, 1857b: 10-11)
11
.  
 The French economists then tried to show that wealth, in turn, permitted virtuous behaviors to 
be developed, which could improve a person's well-being: ―By understanding that the improvement in 
their life is a result of their personal action, individuals, to whom a legitimate remuneration has come, 
acquire more value and a clearer sense of their force.‖ (Renouard, 1862: 330). As a result, they became 
―naturally more humane‖ (Dunoyer, 1843: 249), developing a ―love of the sciences and of poetry‖, a 
taste for altruism and more generally for ―a higher order of pleasures‖ (ibid.: 247). But such a result 
could not be attained under ―corrupting systems of protection and undue monopoly‖ (ibid.):  
―we consider that these vices [―greed, ostentation, personality‖] are particularly incited by certain 
regimes, born of their influence, and in which everything seems primed to excite and satisfy them. 
It is, for example, quite natural that zeal for profits is extreme there where certain classes have 
been given the monopoly for excessively lucrative work or services, where unfair favors allow 
enormous profits to be earned in little time; and it is easy to understand that these immoderate 
profits of a few enflame the cupidity of all; that soon no one is content to simply make a profit; 
that everyone aspires to rapid riches; that little by little all the means to fortune end up appearing 
to slow.  It is also natural that there where profits are immoderate, expenses become exorbitant 
[…] Finally, again, a very natural occurrence is […] that there where the zeal for profit closes the 
heart to justice, people are not very open to benevolent sentiments‖ (Dunoyer, 1843: 245-46). 
 Finally, the French affirmation of the moral character of political economy was based on its 
objective: by taking ―the study of human faculties‖ (Clavet, 1868: 247) as the starting point, economic 
science adopted human liberty as a ―fundamental principle […] since if Man isn't free, he cannot be 
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responsible for his acts"
**
 (Clavet, 1868: 228; see also Chevalier, 1850b: 213; Dameth, 1859: 
167). Thus, for French liberals, economic science had the same foundation as the morale (defined as 
the ―science of duty‖) since, without liberty, it would be impossible for humanity to recognize its duty. 
Many 19
th
 century French liberal economists thus considered that recent progress in economic theory 
had led to re-establishing ―Man in his true place, in his appropriate place‖ (Baudrillart, 1864: 32): 
―Man […] is simultaneously the author and the ends [of material wealth]; it is he that creates it, 
employs it, and consumes it‖ (Passy, 1863: viii; see also Wolowski, 1866: 283). Still, as Coquelin 
(1852: 660) indicated, ―there is always a certain morality in human action‖. If Block (1890: 82) can be 
believed, all the French economists were aware of this fact since they all refused to put ―wealth over 
Man‖; like Bastiat, Courcelle-Seneuil and even Joseph Garnier, all took human needs as the starting 
point in their research. 
 On the other hand, the English economists were accused of considering political economy as 
the ―science of wealth‖, or, in other words, a ―material science rather than a moral one‖ (Coquelin, 
1852: 659), and consequently of ―forget[ing] Man and only tak[ing] products into account‖ 
(Villeneuve-Bargemont, 1834, vol. I: 274; Droz, 1846: 59; see also Baudrillart, 1860: 2). Thus Droz 
(1846: 59) affirmed that Ricardo ―establishes that, in a country where 10 million inhabitants can be 
found, if the work of 5 million of them suffices to nourish and clothe them, this country takes no 
advantage from having 12 million inhabitants if the work of 7 million becomes necessary to obtain the 
same result. [Ricardo] is thus indifferent to the existence or non-existence of 2 million inhabitants, if 
the product is the same‖. This criticism echoes one developed by Blanqui, who accused the English 
economists of considering ―the workers as simple instruments of production‖ (1837: 227) and of 
forgetting ―the suffering that all too often accompanies production‖ (1837: 311). Thus, like Blanqui, 
numerous French economists opposed the English development model, founded on large estates, to the 
French development model, which corresponded better to issues of justice since it allowed a large 
number of small estate owners
12
. This was the case for Droz, who underlined that, though large 
agricultural estates certainly increased ―public prosperity‖ (1846: 72), ―moral considerations‖ could 
lead to a preference for ―small estates‖: ―I admit that if twenty of these [small] estates are gathered to 
create a single one, there will be more net product […].  But, let us not create wealth for the sake of 
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wealth, and let us think about happiness. The twenty small estate owners who were working for 
themselves and who henceforth will work for others, will they be happy?‖ (ibid.: 76; see also Passy 
(1845b: 82), Reybaud, 1859: iv
13
 and Legoyt, 1864: 456 and f.). 
The French school can be contrasted with the ―industrious‖ British school: not only were their 
starting points different, but even their objectives diverged.  While the development of wealth was 
supposed to be the goal of all English economists after Smith
14
, in France, the goal was the well-being 
of the person. Blanqui's attempt to re-define the concept of wealth to include social preoccupations 
was indicative of this divergence: ―It is no longer exclusively a question of accelerating production, as 
in the epoch of Smith. Now, it is necessary to control and contain [production] within reasonable 
limits. It is no longer a question of absolute wealth, but of relative wealth; humanity dictates that we 
cease to sacrifice to the advancement of public opulence the masses of men who will rarely profit from 
this progress‖ (1837: 351). In fact, the French liberals insisted on distinguishing the notion of wealth 
from the notion of well-being: thus, as Rapet affirmed (1850: 324), ―well-being did not exist before 
progress in the Arts and in Industry gave birth to it. Before […], there was wealth, luxury, but there 
was no well-being.‖ Nonetheless, these French liberals did not try to define the notion of well-being 
precisely.  It seems that their definition resembled what Villeneuve-Bargemont (1834: 83) described as 
―moral riches‖: for certain authors, virtue; for others, Christian values (Villeneuve-Bargemont, 1834: 
83); in general, well-being was considered to consist of ―the habits of order, assiduity [and] economy‖ 
(Baudrillart, 1869: 42). 
 Because well-being was their objective, the French liberals had to go beyond the simple 
reference to personal interest. Even though it is impossible to deny the importance of the ―doctrine of 
interest‖ that seems to ―correspond the best to the nature of [economists'] research‖, this doctrine 
cannot, as Baudrillart (1860: 54) observed, form the ―moral foundation‖ of political economy: 
according to Reybaud (1849: 178), this ―modern morality that is founded on calculation‖ is in fact 
―somewhat sad in that it […] confirms […] both the decadence of the public mores and the lowering 
of the principles that govern human generations‖. This observation would seem to indicate that 
political economists ―could not content themselves with [a] system‖ that Baudrillart qualified as 
Benthamism (Baudrillart, 1860: 54), but must also take into account the sentiments and passions that 
 9 
were just as determinant in human behavior: ―Man is pushed to produce by self-interest. Member of a 
family, he is also roused by sympathy and by the duty to work and save‖ (Baudrillart, 1862: 48). Of 
course, 19
th
 century French economists refer quite frequently to personal self-interest, but their 
conception of this self-interest is quite broad, going beyond ―selfish interests‖ or ―pecuniary interest‖ 
(Leroy-Beaulieu, 1890: 35 and f.). Fontenay thus affirmed that ―personal self-interest is raised and 
moralized by enlightening. It is interested in order, […] passionate about great general results, […] 
accustomed to seeing humanity as its family. It ends up targeting the well-being of all through 
spontaneous impulse, without waiting for external pressure to be brought.‖ On the contrary, 
utilitarianism is generally associated with selfishness: thus, in his chapter about J. Bentham, Reybaud 
(1849: 244) affirms that utility is ―forgetting others and focusing on self, […] the worship of self and 
personal interests, in other words, egoism‖15. 
 This conception of the economy had repercussions on the method that French economists 
thought should be adopted by economists. For the large majority of French liberals, the consequence 
of this conception was the rejection of the mathematical method
16
, which they again assimilated with 
the British school. In their opinion, the mathematical method reduced the motivations of the individual 
to a simple search for personal self-interest: they felt that the method based on such an abstraction 
ignored ―language, custom, prejudice, [and] distance‖ and created an ―imaginary world‖ in which 
humanity lost its ―moral‖ aspect and was reduced to its ―economic‖ aspect (Baudrillart, 1866: 14-15). 
Thus, they felt the sphere of political economy was limited by this method, since the consequences of 
economic activity on well-being were excluded: ―In all that, where is the consideration of the well-
being of the producers? […] The workers [have been reduced to] machines with a productive capacity 
that is relatively inferior compared to real machines‖ (Ibid.: 15). But the most important likely 
consequence of abusing this abstraction is underlined by Gouraud (1852: 275), who sees in socialism 
―the natural fruit of the speculative spirit that, for nearly thirty years, has unfortunately dominated 
economic studies‖17: 
―It is not a question of observing the facts in political economy, says the first chimerical spirit to 
arrive. It is rather a question of reasoning, and reasoning in the hypothesis of the greatest possible 
happiness for individuals and peoples, excluding the obstacles that the physical or moral laws, 
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eternal or established, put in the path of the most rapid attainment and the most absolute 
possession of this happiness. […] Under the pretext of the ideal, the most inept utopias, the most 
deceitful projects, the most nonsensical ideas are produced.  Then one unhappy day—encouraged 
by a political uproar that, in and of itself, is nothing—a terrible social explosion took place, and 
the entire territory of Europe trembled‖ (Gouraud, 1852: 275-276).  
 
 §. 2) The second theme of the French economists' criticisms of the British school of economic 
thought is also linked to the question of well-being, since this theme concerns the individual behavior 
of economic agents, specifically with regard to individual responsibility. In particular, this theme of 
criticism clarifies exactly why these economists were so strongly opposed to what they called 
―Ricardo's Law‖ (i.e., Ricardo's rent theory18), even if their position was much more nuanced on 
Malthus's law of population growth, the other law that they felt characterized the British school. 
 If Batbie (1861: 250) can be believed, the ―ingenious‖ Ricardian rent theory ―was accepted 
without dispute until the somber light of socialism revealed its perils‖. As Leroy-Beaulieu (1881: vi) 
noted, ―Ricardo's famous law about land rents has no application in the present time, and the corollary 
that Proudhon extracted from this law—'Property is theft'— collapses with it‖19. Thus, it appears that 
this theory's consequences, which were thought to be ―quite inauspicious for humanity‖ (Leroy-
Beaulieu, 1896, I: 731-32), provoked its almost unanimous rejection by the French liberals; by linking 
the existence of rent to differences in land fertility, and by declaring that the price of a good depended 
on the production costs that it generated, the rent theory led to two conclusions that liberals could not 
accept. The first was related to the notion of rent itself and its relationship to property. In Société 
d’Economie Politique (1852: 107), Fontenay asked ―how can property be legitimized from the point of 
view of justice, if it is acceptable that the Rent comes from an advantage of fertility or of situation to 
which Man, the owner, doesn't contribute?‖20. The second was related to the fact that the Ricardian 
theory resulted in a ―progressive and continuous rise in the price of food substances, [and a] 
progressive and continuous rise in land revenues, to the detriment of other productive agents‖ 
(Molinari, 1863: 384). In other words, the rent theory accepted that landowner interests were opposed 
to societal interests, since ―the richer the landowner becomes, the more difficult life becomes for the 
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rest of the population‖ (Batbie, 1861: 251; see also Beauregard, 1888: xxii). On the contrary, the 
French economists all agreed that this ―fatalist‖21 theory should be countered because ―what would be 
the use of developing commerce and industry, of simplifying work with machines and of multiplying 
this work by accumulating capital, if the men, [caught] in the middle of all this movement, become 
each day poorer and more unhappy?‖ (Faucher, 1852: 572). This denunciation of the dangerous, 
pessimistic and fatalist character of ―Ricardo's law‖ is based on two arguments.  
The first is based on observation, which demonstrated the lack of justification for Ricardo‘s 
law. Leroy-Beaulieu
22
 (1896, I: 744) observed that ―every increase in the power of Man over Nature is 
an obstacle to Ricardo's law‖. Faithful to his method of analysis, Leroy-Beaulieu then tried to 
highlight the forces that hindered the tendencies to rent increases, concluding that this law is possible 
―only for limited applications‖ (1896, I: 739). One of the details most frequently mentioned in 
criticisms of the rent theory is based on the observed improvement of the population's well-being in 
France. In fact, if Fontenay can be believed, worker salaries had tripled over the last century (cited by 
Molinari, 1863: 382 n. 1), while Beauregard (1888: xxiii) estimated that, for France, this rise was ―at 
least 40 or 50%, even after deducting the increase in the price of subsistence‖ (see also Fix, 1844: 12; 
Faucher, 1848: 9; Dameth, 1859: 400)
23
. 
The second argument is related to how the variables of distribution are determined.  In general, 
for 19
th
 century French liberal economists, it was a question of demonstrating that society's 
development allowed each class to improve its position. For this reason, it was necessary to establish 
the rents as the compensation for improved land quality, which helped to increase land productivity. 
According to Faucher (1852: 572), ―with scientific and industrial progress, more can be produced 
today through the same amount of work. This increase in production, which determines the low price 
of products, benefits mostly the workforce.‖ In fact, the concept of rent had to be redefined so that it 
no longer appeared to be the result of a gift of Nature ―for which the owner assigns the profits to 
himself‖ (Molinari, 1863: 346 n1)24. Furthermore, Block (1890: 148) insisted that the idea that ―Nature 
works for free‖ was ―false‖: ―We must grab hold of Nature and force it to work like a slave, directing 
its forces, supervising it closely, and generally putting our nose to the grindstone‖. However, there was 
no consensus on this redefinition. For some, rent was the ―just remuneration for dangerous difficult 
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work with random results‖, which meant that ―land appropriation doesn't harm non-landowners and 
doesn't deprive anyone of his legitimate rights‖ (Le Hardy de Beaulieu, 1861: 347; see also Passy, in 
Société d’Economie Politique, 1866b: 453), while others considered that rent was a revenue from 
capital (Fonteyraud, 1847: liv; see also Dameth, 1859: 391)
25
. However, in both of these cases, it was 
assumed that rent constituted a payment for a service, and consequently, excluded the possibility of no 
remuneration for appropriated land, leading du Puynode (1866: 20) to write, ―I cannot believe, despite 
Ricardo or Andersen, that landowners, ever so slightly privileged as may be, would consent to 
cultivate their property [héritages] or to let it be cultivated without drawing some net revenue.‖ But, 
redefining rent was not enough to call into question the idea of a conflict between the interests of 
estate owners and those of the employees; for that, it was also necessary to show that the salary level 
depended, not on the price of subsistence goods, but on the supply and demand of labor (see Droz, 
1846: 242; Dameth, 1859: 309; Fonteyraud, 1853: 205; Leroy-Beaulieu, 1900: 779). According to 
Garnier (1846: 43), this new conception had another advantage: a reduction in salary was thus 
―independent of the will of the masters of enterprise‖, from which Garnier deduced that ―the hostility 
and the antipathy between these two elements of production costs, salaries and profits, doesn't exist‖. 
The second theory under discussion among French liberals was the one called ―Malthus's 
Law‖, which Passy (in Société d’économie politique, 1863: 333) summarized quite simply as the idea 
that ―the population tends to grow more rapidly than subsistence [goods]‖. But while the Ricardian 
rent theory was almost unanimously condemned by French economists, Malthus's law generated many 
more divergent positions. Certainly, numerous economists drew attention to the pessimistic 
conclusions to which this law naturally led (Droz, 1846: 282-83; Passy, 1857: 224 n. 1). But, all 
insisted that these conclusions could be avoided by individual action: ―thanks to the argument 
concerning the biological responsibility of individuals, the Malthusian heritage thus allowed socialist 
utopias to be refuted‖ (Charbit, 1981: 288; see also Spengler, 1936: 58526).  In fact, this is a dominant 
theme in French liberal thought. While the Ricardian rent theory is called ―fatalist‖, presenting a 
reduction of the wage rate as an inevitable consequence of the scarcity of the land, about which Man 
can have no say
27, Malthus ―indicated that the remedy depends on our free will, voluntary self-
restraint‖ (Batbie, 1862: 108). Wolowski (1848: 3) wrote that Malthus had ―awaken[ed] this concern 
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for tomorrow […] that Man alone possesses, [and] which [is] the most noble attribute of his 
intelligence‖. Thus, according to Molinari (1884a: 9), ―perhaps [the] principle merit‖ of Malthus's 
work was that it contained ―an energetic and solidly-composed plea for individual responsibility‖. 
Malthus showed that the causes of poverty must not be sought in the social and institutional 
conditions, in the ―vices of society‖ (Dupuit, 1863: 115), but in the improvidence of the working class, 
which was the ―primary cause of their moral suffering as well as their physical suffering‖ (Levasseur, 
1867: 226)
28
. 
 However, if during the first half of the 19
th
 century, ―Malthusianism was exceptionally popular 
in France‖ (Breton and Klotz, 2006: 339), the debates at the Société d’Economie Politique in 1862-63 
saw an ―upsurge of anti-Malthusianism‖ (Ibid.: 347). In 1863, Fontenay estimated that nearly three-
quarters, and maybe as many as nine-tenths, of the Société d’Economie Politique members were 
convinced that Malthus's theory was wrong. This opposition can be explained primarily by elements 
that have little relationship with the state of political economy. In fact, the opposition was mostly due 
to the results of the 1861 French population census, published in 1862, which highlighted the low 
growth rate of the French population, but also the deterioration of the social climate and the evolution 
of the international situation (Charbit, 1981). Still, to justify his rejection of Malthus's Law, Fontenay 
underlined that which, in his opinion, constituted ―one of the most profoundly repugnant aspects of the 
Malthusian doctrine‖: the idea that ―vice was the supreme utility‖, since ―if the race has not bred 
prolifically beyond all measure and all possibility of progress, it's because its multiplicative force was 
stopped by war, tyranny, infanticide, slavery, polygamy [and] prostitution‖ (Fontenay, 1863: 452-
453). Ultimately, since it attributed positive consequences to immoral behaviors, it would seem 
fortunate that the law of population growth could be declared ―wrong‖. 
 Even in this extreme form, the evaluation by French liberals of British economic theories 
appears as a consequence of their general conception of political economy: by discarding an exclusive 
focus on material determinants and self-interest (such as they attributed to Ricardo) and grounding 
economic activity in a morale of individual responsibility, these authors felt authorized to reject 
analytical conclusions which, according to them, only resulted from a lack of consideration for the 
productive powers of morally inspired individuals. 
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 There was another reason for French liberals‘ rejection of British economic theories, and it had 
nothing to do with their method of analysis: their most-pressing fear of a challenge to the social order. 
By stripping economic relations from any moral implication, and by exacerbating the search for self-
interest, the theories developed by the members of the British school, raised social unrest and 
facilitated the development of socialist thought; hence the necessity of refusing the laws, principles 
and methods advocated by these theories. For French liberals, it was necessary to demonstrate that 
political economy could not be satisfied with utility alone, but also needed to be concerned with 
justice. Because the French school was aware of this fact, it considered itself superior to the British 
school, as witnessed by Blanqui's observation: ―Fortunately, France has claimed its customary 
privilege of defending the rights of humanity, and while Great Britain has progressed by giant steps in 
industry, our writers have reminded Great Britain of the sacred principles of equitable distribution of 
the profits of labor‖ (1837: 227-28). This dual theme of utility and justice is also at the heart of the 
second question examined in this article. 
 
III – THE DANGERS OF QUESTIONING NATURAL RIGHTS  
The period that followed the Revolution of 1848 saw the development of a huge debate in 
France about property rights. Contested by the socialists, particularly by Proudhon who assimilated 
property with theft, it was also the subject of discussion in 1858 during the Brussels Congress devoted 
to intellectual property. Consequently, the liberal economists tried to provide a justification of the 
basis of property rights, as well as the methods of appropriation, according to the type of property 
considered.  Their goal was to legitimize property: they considered that it was their ―duty‖ to convince 
the workers that the right to property could not be questioned since it was a natural right. In doing so, 
the majority of them opposed a legalistic conception of property rights, which was the heritage of 
―Pascal, Montesquieu, Bentham, Mirabeau, Toullier and the old-time jurists in general‖ (Dupuit, 
1861a: 322), and whose dangerous character was once again underlined. These liberals assimilated this 
legalistic conception with socialism since socialism, according to Bastiat (1848b: 310), for example, 
―accepts […] that the entire social order is [set forth] in the law. […] Starting with the idea that the 
society is the work of Man, the work of law, the socialists must infer that nothing exists in society that 
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was not ordered and arranged by the legislator‖. However, the liberals felt that once the legislators had 
given themselves the right ―to arrange, combine and manipulate people and property at will‖ (Bastiat, 
1848a: 182), the result would be the birth of socialist utopias, social unrest and ―irrational and 
tyrannical [government] intervention‖ (Garnier, 1873: 113). The debate about the basis of property 
rights was only one aspect of a more general discussion about the existence of natural laws in 
economy. According to Molinari (1884b: 371), ―economists‖ could be characterized by their belief in 
the existence of natural law, while ―socialists of all schools […] deny the existence of natural laws and 
attribute to the State the mission of compensating [for this lack by creating] artificial laws which they 
are responsible for dictating to the State‖  
For French liberals, accepting the criterion of general utility as the unique goal of society 
would ultimately lead to sacrificing the individual, his liberty and his property to society (see, for 
example, Say, 1886: 144). Thus, Baudrillart (1864: 33) asked, ―Are you astonished, for example, that 
these confusions—which totally eliminate the free and predominant action of Man, [who is], in the 
final analysis, the unique author of this grand transformation of the world that is called industry—have 
first produced a narrow; inaccurate and fortuitous idea of property, […] conceived far from any idea of 
liberty [and] personality [and which is] only legitimized later by general interest […]?‖. French 
liberals could hardly agree to such a criterion and remain coherent with the primacy they accorded to 
the study of the individual and his needs in economic theory, which led Clavet (1868: 247), in his 
study of moralists and utilitarians, to consider that utilitarians ―considering society to be a specific 
entity, having its proper existence, seek the interest of this moral and abstract being, without worrying 
about the elements that compose it‖. Furthermore, the hypothesis of an innate sense of justice led 
French liberals to emphasize the superiority of this reference to natural law, since ―the light of justice‖ 
is ―more accessible to all regards‖ (Passy, in Société d‘économie politique, 1862: 152), while the idea 
―of general interest divides even the men the most capable of discerning it‖ (Clavet, 1868: 235). As 
Passy (in Société d‘économie politique, 1862: 152) commented: ―Tell the poor that the common 
interest requires that wealth be left in the hands of the rich, and that estate and inheritance [hérédité] 
are necessary because they are useful, and he will ask you what should be his concern with a common 
interest that harms his individual interest‖. Thus, most French liberal economists felt that if no 
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consensus could be had on what exactly constitutes the notion of social utility, legitimizing institutions 
solely on the basis of this notion opened the way to social unrest. 
However, all the liberal economists of the 19
th
 century didn't necessarily share the belief in the 
existence of natural law, and this was especially true of Courcelle-Seneuil and Dupuit. Both of these 
economists attempted to show that social utility was the only rational basis for property rights that 
would be capable of explaining the differences in legislation over time and space, and that this opinion 
(i.e., opposition to natural law) didn't risk society ―falling into chaos‖ (Courcelle-Seneuil, 1866: 
169)
29
. Dupuit's position, without doubt more straightforward than Courcelle-Seneuil's, was received 
with criticism by his contemporaries. Of course, it was not the first time that Dupuit‘s positions were 
at variance with the liberal economists‘ ones. But this time, the issue was so sensitive that Dupuit‘s 
stance provoked a strong protest: in a rare occurrence, the January 1861 publication of the first of his 
two articles about property was preceded by an ―editorial note‖ declaring ―that by including this piece 
by one of its savant collaborators, the Journal des Economistes, as a collective instrument of science, 
leaves the responsibility [for the article] to its author [Dupuit], who considers himself the defender of 
an opinion that has the majority of [the authors in] this collection against it.‖. Clearly, these debates 
(§.1) provided evidence of the common desire of the participants to defend property against the attacks 
that threatened it. Affirming the natural character of property rights seemed, to most of them, to be an 
effective guarantee against the random intervention of public authorities in the economy, especially 
when the question of redistribution or inheritance is considered (§.2). 
 
§.1) If the goal of liberal French economists was to avoid all contestation of property rights, 
they first had to show that these rights were just.  But where does the idea of justice come from? For 
most of these economists, justice was in no way linked to positive law. They felt that Nature creates 
justice, since the individual has a conscience that, before any law, indicates what is just or unjust. 
Thus, Clavet (1868: 233) wrote, ―We all have in us an idea of Good and Evil, if not completely 
developed, at least emerging‖. The idea of justice was thus, for them, innate. As Baudrillart (1869: 87) 
observed, ―killing, beating, stealing, not delivering through fraud that which we have promised to 
return, are unjust actions.‖ He continued, ―Does your conscience not cry out, even if there are no 
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written laws?‖ Consequently, they thought that ―the idea of justice imposes itself on [even] the least 
developed intelligences‖ (Clavet, 1868: 235). This anteriority of justice with respect to positive law 
was also demonstrated by history, since, as Clavet noted, ―there have been […] unjust laws‖ (ibid.), 
suggesting justice cannot come from civil legislation. Thus, though the law reflects that which is 
useful at one moment or period in time, ―the idea of justice has primacy and will always have primacy 
over the idea of utility‖ (Fontenay, in Société d‘économie politique, 1855: 152). 
 In order to establish that property rights were just, it was thus necessary to show that they were 
natural, or in other words, that they existed before society. In fact, though French liberals agreed that 
property is based on labor, they also felt that man only labors if he had previously established his 
rights to the product of his activity. Thus, for Bastiat (1848a: 178), ―Man is born a property owner”; 
he only works if he is ―SURE to be able to apply the fruit of his labor to meet his needs‖ (ibid.). In 
other words, the idea of property ―came full blown from [Man] and […] is, to a certain extent, simply 
an emanation of his being‖ (Wolowski and Levasseur, 1884: 711), ―an extension of his person in 
space‖ (ibid.: 716). Once again, liberals used history to prove the anteriority of property rights: 
"property […] is recognized even among savages, who have no laws, or at least, no written laws." 
(ibid.). 
Clearly, if the notion of property stems from natural law, it is immutable, since all natural laws 
are by definition ―universal and permanent, true in time and in space, like all scientific laws‖ (Liesse, 
1892: 131). Herein lies the primary stakes in the opposition between the naturalist conception and the 
positivist conception of property rights. For French liberals, the second conception would clearly lead 
to basing property rights on a foundation that was ―quite mutable‖ (Baudrillart, 1869: 88), that carried 
in it the seeds of despotism. By leaving to the State the right to decide to change the distribution of 
property at will, this second conception would become just or unjust ―depending on the ideas passing 
through the head of the legislator‖ (Baudrillart, 1869: 88). It followed logically that this would lead to 
great uncertainty, which would be harmful for economic development. As Bastiat (1848a: 287) 
commented: ―capital […] will hide, will desert, will vanish. And what will become of the workers? 
[...] And taxes, from where will you obtain them? And finances, how will they be restored? How will 
you pay the army?‖ (see also du Puynode, 1853: 89). 
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This fear of the arbitrary was one of the recurring themes of liberals who were opposed to a 
positivist conception of property rights (see for example Faucher, 1852: 463; Molinari, 1889: 336). On 
the other hand, those who defended this positivist conception continued their efforts to show that this 
fear was unjustified.  Thus, according to Courcelle-Seneuil (1866: 177), ―if [the notion of property] is 
based on the principle of utility, it has a foundation that nothing can shake, and all the diverse 
conventions that govern property have an explanation that is as clear as it is conclusive‖. In the 
positivists' opinion, it was in the reference to natural law that the arbitrariness so feared could be 
found: given the differences in the legislations of the various countries, basing the notion of property 
on natural law is tantamount to invoking ―a sterile principle, stifled by never-ending exceptions and 
inevitable customary practices‖ (Ibid.: 177; see also Dupuit, in Société d‘économie politique, 1855: 
146). More generally, for these positivists, only by referring to public utility could property rights be 
supported if, for example, it was proved that replacing personal appropriation by common property 
―would be to reduce by half or three-quarters the production and consequently, condemn half or three-
quarters of the current population to death, and the rest to misery and barbarism‖ (Dupuit, 1861a: 346-
47)
30
. 
  Basing property rights on social utility also removed any legitimacy that might be accorded 
to social demands. For this reason, though Dupuit was well aware of the stakes of the debate, since he 
considered that a defense of property based on natural law was the consequence of an ―ill-considered 
fear of communism‖ (1861b: 52), he nonetheless disputed the danger of a positivist conception of 
property rights. In his opinion, the law was designed to maximize the well-being of society's members; 
thus, according to the principle of social utility, the individual had no right to demand modifications in 
the division of wealth since the method of distribution adopted was the one that permitted the maximal 
enrichment of society as a whole: ―[the individual] cannot require that the society impoverish itself to 
enrich [the individual]‖ (1861b: 53). 
 
§. II) Once property rights had been recognized as natural, the consequences of these rights 
could not be disputed.  Three of these consequences are important and thus should be highlighted. 
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The first consequence is the inequality of condition that these rights engendered. According to 
Faucher (1856: 466), this inequality was ―itself only the reflection of the differences that Nature has 
established between men‖ (see also Dameth, 1859: 384). Thus, these inequalities were also considered 
natural: property only ―makes them durable and gives them body‖ (Faucher, 1856: 421). Dunoyer 
(1845: 457) mobilized arguments about individual responsibility to affirm that inequality was an 
―element of social progress‖. He was convinced that, to use Garnier's terms (Garnier, 1850: 19), ―in 
the greatest number of cases, each person possesses according to his labor‖, adding that ―it is good that 
there are in society inferior places where the families that behave badly are supposed to fall, from 
whence they cannot rise without behaving well. Misery is [a] frightening hell.‖ Even better, for 
Dameth (1872: 79), inequality benefited the most underprivileged: it ―tends to increase the solidarity 
and mutual aid between men because it makes the weak benefit from the superiority of the strong.‖ 
The second consequence is related to the right to transmit property. As Faucher (1852: 466) 
wrote, ―property implies inheritance‖, which in turn ―is necessary for property, just as property itself is 
necessary for social order‖ (ibid.: 467; see also Fonteyraud, 1853: 201). Thus, Baudrillart (1872: 55) 
considered an inheritance in the same light as a gift: ―[a person] who could not give the thing he 
possesses would not really be its owner‖. Like property rights, inheritance rights have an absolute 
character for French liberals: ―the property owner has the right to dispose of [his] goods in favor of 
who it pleases him in the present, and by the same reasoning, to dispose of them after his death‖ 
(Comte, 1852: 859). Still, many French liberals were opposed to unlimited freedom to bequeath, and 
from this perspective, they defended ―a right of regulation‖, which was nonetheless considered to be a 
potential ―source of tyranny‖ (Baudrillart, 1857b: 16): for example, Passy (1866: 453-54) justified the 
laws of the Napoleonic Code by evoking the responsibility of a father to his children; the father has  
―contracted toward them obligations that he cannot be exempted from fulfilling. He is expected to 
raise them, to nourish them, to preserve them from suffering that can be avoided, and these 
obligations, the law itself mentions and imposes. Now, how [can we] accept that that which the 
law expects of a father when he is alive, it exempts him from, when, dying, he leaves the means to 
continue the work that he was accomplishing?‖  
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The reconciliation of the property owner's liberty and his heirs' protection thus constituted ―a 
difficult problem‖ that the legislator had to resolve (Esquirou de Parieu, 1852: 670): as Dupuit (1865: 
196) suggested when highlighting the limits of a naturalist conception of property rights, the ―natural 
rights of children‖ are opposed to the ―natural rights or […] duties of fathers‖.  
On the other hand, if property is based on law, ―the right to bequeath will only be a simple 
tolerance, a purely legal right, conferred by the society for its own advantage. The society can without 
injustice strip me of a right that I have wholly made my own.‖ (Baudrillart, 1860: 115; see also 
Chevalier, 1862: 367-68). According to Baudrillart, the proof of this consequence could be found in 
the writings of Bentham, who pronounced himself in favor of limiting the right to bequeath in Supply 
without Burthen. Baudrillart (1857b: 20) also thought that the position of John Stuart Mill (p. 456) in 
favor of limiting the amount that each person could acquire through inheritance ―reveal[ed] a socialist 
idea of leveling‖, which, according to Say (1886: 161), was the direct consequence of Mill's 
conception of the right to inherit as an ―invention of law‖. 
Finally, the third consequence is related to taxes. With arguments that differ only slightly, 
many liberals concluded that taxes must be proportional—and non-progressive. In fact, they felt that 
taxes must not serve to modify the distribution of wealth in society (Esquirou de Parieu, 1857: 322; 
Royer, 1862a: 268; Dameth, 1872: 180) since this distribution was the result of natural differences 
between individuals. Thus, Royer (1862a: 268) indicated that, over a long period, a progressive tax 
structure ―would rapidly become detrimental because it would tend to destroy in society the 
inequalities that are fortunate when they are natural, or in other words, as long as the inequalities of 
economic faculties remains exactly proportional to the inequalities of intellectual and moral 
faculties‖31. A debate organized by Léon Say at the Société d’Economie Politique in 1884 reflected 
this conception: the question asked—―Is the objective of financial science the modification of the 
natural distribution of wealth through taxation?‖—made it clear that, for Say, taxes should be 
considered as a simple fiscal instrument, and should not be used as a means of redistribution (see also 
Société d‘Economie Politique, 1891)32. If the opposite were true, ―civil equality‖ would no longer 
preside: such a system would be organized ―from the perspective of these schools of leveling, which 
employ taxes as an artificial instrument for equalizing conditions‖ (Baudrillart, 1866: 339). However, 
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some liberals defended the principle of tax exemption for low revenues
33, as a ―means of re-
establishing the proportionality of the tax system‖ (Delatour, 1894: 366). They noted that, in fact, 
indirect taxes hit those who earned these low revenues harder
34
 (Passy, 1852: 273; Dameth, 1859: 427; 
Le Hardy de Beaulieu, 1861: 318; Leroy-Beaulieu, 1879: 163; Stourm, 1893: 236). But they took care 
to underline that such as measure could not be assimilated with progressivity
35
, and that it only tended 
to correct an ―inevitable inequality‖ (Leroy-Beaulieu, 1879: 163; see also Chailley-Bert, 1884: 420). 
This tax neutrality was based on a conception of taxes that held that taxes were either a 
payment for a service performed, or the equivalent of an insurance premium, or even ―a contribution 
[…] that the public authorities require from citizens to support government expenses‖ (Leroy-
Beaulieu, 1879: 105). Some considered that taxes had to be analyzed from an insurance perspective: 
taxes ―[are] and must only be an insurance premium paid by all members of a society, called a Nation, 
with the effect of insuring the full satisfaction of their rights, the efficient protection of their interests 
and the free exercise of their faculties‖ (Girardin, 1852: 229). Consequently, those who defended this 
insurance perspective thought that taxes must be paid like an insurance premium, or in other words, 
proportionally to the goods that the person wanted to insure
36
. In this regard, du Puynode (1853: 91) 
asked, ―Does 200 francs of revenue require a stronger guarantee, a more difficult guard when only one 
receives them than when they are given to 2 and to 2 rather than 3?‖. Others insisted that taxes 
represented a payment for the service of protection provided to individuals by the State. Thus, again 
according to du Puynode, taxes were ―the fraction that each person pays into the common till to insure 
the peaceful enjoyment of his goods and the respect of his person‖ (see also Rondelet, 1860: 306; Le 
Hardy de Beaulieu, 1861: 307; Baudrillart, 1866: 133; Chailley-Bert, 1884: 408n1; Delatour, 1894: 
366).  
From this perspective, a progressive tax system would be like ―making people pay differently 
for the same things‖ (Thiers, 1848: 312); on the contrary, ―proportionality is a principle […].  [If] the 
costs of social protection represent a tenth of the total revenue, well then a tenth for everyone.‖ 
(Thiers, 1848: 319). Finally, Leroy-Beaulieu's conception of taxes simply took into account, in 
addition to the services performed by the State, the existence of the public debt that also had to be 
financed through taxes (Leroy-Beaulieu, 1879: 138). Under these conditions, his position is hardly 
 22 
different from the one held by economists who considered taxes as a payment for services provided: it 
was, in fact, a question ―of recovering for each [individual] the just price for the services provided and 
the just fraction of the interest and the amortization of the nation debt‖ (1879: 139). However, Leroy-
Beaulieu observed that a progressive tax would suppose that ―the advantages that the State provides to 
large estates or to large estate owners are proportionally greater that the advantages it provides to 
medium or small estates and to medium or small estate owners‖. Such a hypothesis was, in his 
opinion, totally false. In fact, he declared that ―the opposite is true‖ (ibid.). 
However they defined the tax system, the liberals tried to include the principle of justice in 
their argumentation: thus, in general, they saw proportionality as corresponding to principles of justice 
or equity (Passy, 1852: 258 and 260; Le Hardy de Beaulieu, 1861: 308; Baudrillart, 1864: 48). Once 
again, this was demonstrated by their rejection of the arbitrary, which they assimilated with a 
progressive tax system (Say, 1886: 168-70). On the one hand, they felt that the progressivity rule was 
a political choice, one made by the legislator, and thus depended on the circumstances. Du Puynode 
(1853: 89) wondered, ―How should the progression be determined[.] That which some would find just 
[would be], in any case, only arbitrary, and the system [thus] that has been taken for truth lacks in any 
[real] basis‖. Continuing his analysis, he underlined the negative effects of a progressive tax, not only 
on labor—since ―[a progressive tax], increasing as wealth accumulates, punishes success [and] seems 
to offer a bonus for laziness and dissipation‖—but especially on the morality of society, since it incites 
―jealousies‖ and ―envy‖ (ibid.) and encourages fraud (Passy, 1848: 307; Leroy-Beaulieu, 1879: 149). 
On the other hand, the principle of progressivity was also justified by the idea of an equal sacrifice 
(Chailley-Bert, 1884: 408). However, this argument assumes that it is possible to evaluate what is 
necessary and what is superfluous (Baudrillart, 1857b: 469; Royer, 1862a: 265), despite the fact that 
such a distinction ―is highly dependent on the character, passions, and habits of individuals‖ (Royer, 
1862a: 266), but also on his/her state of health and his/her dependants (Bonnet, 1877: 441; Passy, 
1895: 53). In other words, ―if […] the ideal to be attained is equality of sacrifice, [the ideal] will be 
lost in the arbitrariness of individual cases‖ (Baudrillart, 1866: 323).  
On the contrary, a positivist conception of property was considered to lead to making the tax 
itself the object of a convention, with the fiscal principles obeying the utility imperative: ―it is believed 
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useful at a certain moment in time to create, for some, unjust privileges […] or indefinitely progressive 
taxes.‖ (ibid.: 352). Again, it was in the writings of Bentham that Baudrillart (1860: 133) found his 
proof for such an application: in fact, it was ―in the name of the idea that makes him attribute to the 
State the task of equalizing conditions [that] Bentham decides in favor on a progressive tax‖37. 
However, a discussion of the tobacco tax at the Société d’économie politique provided evidence of the 
difficulty that French liberals had in defending the notion of justice with regard to taxes: while Dupuit 
(in Société d‘économie politique, 1859b: 470) considered that greatly taxing tobacco, rather than 
sugar, coffee or wine, was justified for reasons of public utility since a reduction in its consumption 
would also be obtained, which ―is more favorable than harmful for the health of the population‖38, 
those who defended a naturalist conception of property were reduced to affirming that such a tax was 
just because it was voluntary
39
. They had therefore to introduce an additional criterion of justice, since 
the reference to natural law could not justify a higher taxation of tobacco. However, the argument of 
the voluntary character of paying the tax may only be accepted if an implicit assumption is made: that 
tobacco is a superfluous expense, which can be dispensed with. Only in that case those who choose to 
consume tobacco also choose to pay the tax, as distinct from the case of a necessary consumption, 
such as, say, sugar. But this implicit assumption then raises the issue of the arbitrary character of the 
distinction between superfluity and necessity.  
 
However, though 19
th
 century French liberals considered that justice existed prior to utility, 
this doesn't mean that they opposed the two. In the case of property, and for the modern period, these 
liberal economists thought that the rights that were associated to property are not only just but also 
useful from a social perspective, leading Faucher (1852: 465) to comment that ―the more property 
increases, strengthens, is respected, the more societies prosper‖. But it was also important for them to 
show that utility was not an adequate basis for property rights. In their opinion, positive law, founded 
on the idea of utility, only intervened to guarantee natural property rights: ―an exact analysis provides 
proof that law doesn't create any rights. Law recognizes rights, defines them, and sanctions them; it 
finetunes them and especially, it regulates their application and their relationships with other rights‖ 
(Leroy-Beaulieu, 1890: 109). 
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IV – CONCLUSION 
The rejection of utilitarianism by liberal economists as the founding principle of the political 
economy confirms their dual interpretation of this philosophy. On the one hand, as a motive for human 
actions, utility is connected to a materialist political economy, which justifies ―this immoderate thirst 
for profit that torments the present generations‖ (Reybaud, 1849: 247); consequently, this philosophy 
can only elicit criticism and has helped to develop socialist schools of thought.  But utilitarianism is 
also associated with public morality, in which utility refers to the collective interest. Understood in 
this way, utilitarianism could not be accepted by French liberals, who considered this reference to 
collective interest to be arbitrary, capable of justifying any system of distribution, including a socialist 
one.  
To sum up, two English authors crystallized their rejection of utilitarianism: Ricardo for his 
neglect of any human motive but self-interest, and Bentham for his apology of State intervention 
motivated by collective interest. 
Further research would be necessary to determine whether their critique of the treatment of 
interest at one level or the other lead to distinct currents among French liberal economists, and how it 
clarifies their relations with other economists of their time, in France or abroad: in this paper, I just 
tried to give a kind of impressionist picture of the French liberal economists‘ position regarding 
utilitarianism. From this, one can already stress that the opposition to utilitarianism, whatever the 
interpretation given by its opponents, had important consequences. It determined the position of 
French liberals on the income tax, the distribution of wealth and property rights. But above all it led 
them to a caricature of that philosophy which would mark French thought for long. Their will to 
defend social order and their fear of socialism would much contribute to their incapacity to understand 
Bentham‘s philosophy40, leading to its disappearance from the French scene. So doing also 
disappeared any possibility for French liberals to follow the path of newly-born English welfare 
economics which was precisely rooted in a utilitarian conception of collective utility. 
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1
 The term ―liberal‖ is used here as it is used in France, to refer to those economists that refuse State 
intervention in the economy because they believe that the results of such intervention would be less 
effective than those produced by free market conditions.  
2
 As for France, see for instance Cherbuliez (1852: 166); Leroy-Beaulieu (1881: 4-5); Foville (1890 : 
222).  
3
 According to Breton (1998: 410), from 1881 on, ―the old liberal school […] was increasingly 
contested. Its French opponents in fact castigated the ‗bad, mean, and low procedures, which it used 
against all those who didn‘t bow before it‘ (Walras [Letter to Gide , April 25, 1886]), as well as its 
desire for complete hegemony among French economists through the institutions it controlled‖  
4
 Still more, their positions were influenced by the Physiocrats, whom they mentioned regularly and 
favourably: for Baudrillart (1888: iv), for example, the ―economic system‖ of the Physiocrats ―was 
summed up in the following ideas: property and liberty, as foundation of social order and expression 
of individual rights‖. Their admiration for Smith‘s theory followed, since, according to them, Smith 
was in the continuity of the Physiocrats: in particular, he admitted the existence of natural laws, while 
at the same time he corrected some of their errors, such as the belief in land being the sole cause of 
wealth (Ibid.: vi) 
5
 This rejection was not shared by all the French liberals: may-be the case of Dupuit constitutes the 
most famous counter-example; Breton and Lutfalla (1991: 592) also point out the specific positions of 
Rossi and Coquelin on this issue.   
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6
 See Blanqui (1837: 227), who thought that the English economists had ―close[d] their ears to 
suffering [letting] themselves be blinded by the prestige of civilization, without asking themselves if 
this brilliant edifice [was] not held together by weeping and tears, and if the base of it [was] so solid 
that no tremor need be feared‖.  
7
 This distinction is not unique to liberal economists. In fact, it can be found, for example, in the 
writings of the historian Buchez (1842) for whom the spirit of the British School is ―personal and 
mercantile‖. On the other hand, although he himself was a liberal economist, Garnier (1873: 663) 
refused this distinction: ―The writers who call themselves the French School have the pretension of 
being closer to the working classes; of introducing spirituality into political economy, in order to better 
highlight the morality of economic truths, the harmony of interests and the solidarity between the 
diverse classes and the various countries. To that must be said that political economy is fortunately 
outside of the unintelligible discussions of spirituality and materialism; and that, from its beginning 
and in all countries, the aspirations of economists, and of economic science in general, have been 
guided by the desire to see the conditions of the poorest and most numerous classes improve by means 
of general prosperity, resulting from instruction and the good moral habits of all.‖ Arena (1991a: 116-
117) explains that refusal by Garnier‘s fear that such a conception could ―lead to include in political 
economy the attempts at ‗finding the systems of social organization‘ which were new [...], i.e. socialist 
utopias.‖ 
8
 The Societé d'Economie Politique, created in 1842 by E. Daire, U. Guillaumin, J. Garnier, A. Blaise 
and P. Hos, met once a month. The objectives of the society were defined when the members wrote 
the society's by-laws in 1886: ―to contribute to the vulgarization and the advancement of political 
economy‖ (Société d’Economie Politique, 1886: 21), which, in fact, meant the defense of free trade.  
9
 I'm not referring here to the nature of the relationship between the morale and political economy. 
Clearly, for some of these economists, the economy was subordinated to the morale (e.g., Baudrillart), 
while for others, the economy had no hierarchical relationship whatsoever with the morale (e.g., 
Fontenay).  
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10
  Luxury was the subject of many debates among the French economists because they had difficulty 
distinguishing between expenditures that were luxuries and those that were simply part of the lifestyle 
of the wealthier classes. Droz's proposal (1846: 312) to call luxury expenditures ―immoral 
expenditures‖ reflects this difficulty: ―If a worker, happy in his work, allows himself in the bosom of 
his family a small country party, I would approve of it, but if he drinks his money in a cabaret, he is 
making a luxury expenditure. That a rich man gives his wife a shawl costing 3000 francs, this expense, 
proportional to his fortune, is not unreasonable; if he buys this shawl for his mistress, it is a luxury 
expense.‖ A session of Société d’économie politique was devoted to this subject in 1859. Reports of 
this session show that the economists present were in agreement that expenses that exceeded revenue 
(Garnier, in Société d’économie politique, 1859a: 302; see also Baudrillart, 1880-1881, I: 82-83), that 
were harmful to health (Garnier, in Société d’économie politique, 1859a: 302), that ―attacked the 
dignity and morality of others‖ (Lavergne, in ibid.) and that were contrary to ―religious and […] 
customary moral conduct‖ (Dunoyer, in ibid), all constituted ―immoral consumption‖. They all agreed 
that the question ―cannot be resolved independently of the relative circumstances of the situation‖ 
(Baudrillart, in ibid.: 303 and 1880-1881, IV: 3-4). 
11
 The position of French economists with respect to the consequences of inheritance on the moral 
sentiments of individuals is developed by Steiner (2008: 90-91).  
**
 Translators note: The language of the 19
th
 century is certainly sexist, with its use of ―Man‖ and ―he‖ 
to refer to all of humanity. I have chosen to use the words of the writers as they wrote them.  
Sometimes, this will mean using sexist language in the text itself, in order to smooth the transition 
from citation to text. My apologies for any affront to reader sensibilities.  
12
 Based on MacCulloch's work, Equirou de Parieu (1852: 674) indicated that in France land parcels 
measured an average of 13 hectares, compared to 75 hectares in England. See also Legoyt (1864: 434), 
who estimated that in 1851, in France land parcels measured  an average of 11 hectares 7 ares. 
13
 Reybaud's analysis concerns industry and not agriculture. This question of property parceling was 
the subject of numerous discussions among liberal economists, who questioned the existence of this 
phenomenon (parceling was often analyzed as a consequence of the Civil Code that imposed equal 
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shares for each child– see Fonteyraud, 1853: 202; Esquirou de Parieu, 1852), but who also questioned 
the economic and moral consequences of the practice. Thus, while Fix (1864: 313) underlined the 
negative effects of ―land parceling‖ in terms of credit access, Baudrillart (1883: 103) considered that a 
small estate ―is very productive in terms of the work dynamic that it develops‖ (see also Passy, 1846: 
16 and f.).   
14
 Generally, French liberals identified themselves with Smith, while criticizing his successors, 
particularly Ricardo and MacCulloch. Thus, Paulet (1866: 92) didn't hesitate to affirm that economic 
science ―is the science of the well-being of nations [bien-être des Nations]‖, adding that ―it is the title 
of Adam Smith's famous treatise, who never said the wealth of nations [richesse des nations]‖. 
15
 Although it was not shared by all (e.g. for example Benoist: 184), that vision of utilitarianism 
marked the whole French tradition. It does however conform to the philosophies of neither Bentham 
nor John Stuart Mill. 
16
 Ricardo's method, considered as a prime example of the mathematical method, was first criticized 
by a number of liberal French economists.  But, a change in tone can be perceived with respect to this 
mathematical method by the end of the 19
th
 century, no doubt due to the rise of German historical 
thought, which henceforth had to be combated (see for instance Beauregard, 1888 : xxii.  
17
 This point is to be linked with one of the reasons generally put forward to explain the rejection of 
the mathematical method by French liberals: their fear of that method was connected to the fact that it 
was used by adversaries of free trade (see Breton, 1992: 31). 
18
  This rejection of the Ricardian rent theory was widespread in France, with the exception of Rossi 
(1836-7: 80), for whom it constituted ―the glory of modern political economy‖.  
19
 As for Proudhon, see for instance what he wrote in Qu’est-ce que la propriété? (1840: 123): 
―According to Ricardo, MacCulloch and [James] Mill, farm-rent, properly speaking, is simply the 
excess of the produce of the most fertile land over that of inferior land, so that farm-rent is not 
demanded for the former until the increase of population makes necessary the cultivation of the latter. 
It is difficult to see any sense in this. How can different qualities of land result in a right to the land? 
How can varieties of soil engender a principle of legislation and politics?‖ 
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20
 This point was disputed by Courcelle-Seneuil (1854: 413) in his review of Fontenay's work, La 
rente foncière. In Courcelle-Seneuil's opinion, it was impossible to consider that the Ricardian rent 
theory ―weaken[ed] property rights‖ unless these were assumed to be ―simply individual rights‖.  He 
continued, ―Property rights are based on completely different considerations, originating in and 
sanctioning public and social utility‖. See infra.  
21
 This fatalistic character was nonetheless discussed and refuted by Courcelle-Seneuil (1854: 416), 
who with regard to Ricardian rent theory wondered, ―Is this the expression of a fatalistic and static 
theory? Probably not, since it acknowledges the action of those causes that lower the Rent and whose 
principal is the development the art of agriculture.‖  
22
 Leroy-Beaulieu considered that what he calls ―Ricardo's Law‖ was true in its tendency, but was not 
applied—an opinion that was scarcely shared by his French contemporaries.  
23
 Among the other details evoked to criticize the rent theory was the order in which the land was 
cultivated.  For example, Beauregard (1888: 89), citing Carey (The past, the Present and the Future, 
1848), contested the fact that the most fertile estates were cultivated first. (see also Fontenay, 1854: 53 
and f.; Chevalier, 1850a: 71-72; du Puynode, 1860: 113; Le Hardy de Beaulieu, 1861: 280 ; and 
Leroy-Beaulieu, 1881: 21, 81; Guyot, 1895: 229). On the opposite, Block (1890: 214) for example 
criticized the way Carey called in question the ricardian theory of rent.   
24
 Molinari didn't attribute this conception of rent to Ricardo. On the contrary, he considered that 
―Ricardo has perfectly refuted [this] quite erroneous and quite dangerous opinion, demonstrating that 
the collaboration of God or of Nature is present in all productive agents and that [this collaboration] is 
always free‖.  
25
 This line of defense was criticized by Garnier, who underlined that ―the communists do not 
recognize the legitimacy of the appropriation of the fruits of labor‖ (in Société d’économie politique, 
1866b: 449).  He upheld a definition of rent as revenue from a ―natural monopoly‖.  
26
 ―Virtually every French defender of Malthus belonged to the liberal school, in the hands of whose 
members Malthusianism became an integral part of a broader doctrine of individual responsibility‖. 
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27
 For example, Buret (1840: 177) wrote that the reduction of the wage rate ―becomes a fact in the 
necessary material order‖.  
28
 Malthus is nonetheless qualified as a utilitarian by Reybaud (1849: 181-182) who criticizes Malthus 
for basing all his reasoning ―on highly suspicious calculations in eyes other than his own‖, for thinking 
that ―it is given to man to compensate entirely for Providence‖, and for thinking that ―the morality of 
humanity is nothing more than an ingenious mechanism for which it is possible to determine the 
formula and regulate the movement‖. On the opposite, Monjean (1846: xiii) considers that Malthus 
refuted ―Bentham utilitarian doctrines‖.    
29
 In the entry on property rights that he wrote for the Nouveau Dictionnaire d’économie politique, 
Courcelle-Seneuil (1900: 643) considered that socialism was based not on a legal explanation of 
property rights, but on the theory ―that property originated in war‖, leading ―popular opinion [to] 
consider the state of property to be a violent state‖.  
30
 Note that the reference to public utility also allows expropriation for public use to be explained. 
Otherwise, expropriation for public use must be considered as a ―derogation from the principle of the 
inviolability of property, the foundation of all organized societies.‖ (Fontaine, 1889-1894: 203)  
31
 Royer‘s position must be clarified, since in her Théorie de l’impôt ou la dime sociale, she argued 
that only a progressive tax is fair (1862b: 53). But she considered that such a tax should be only a 
short-lived measure, ―which cannot be in effect over a long period without affecting justice and social 
prosperity‖ (ibid.: 48; see also p. 63): ―When finally all citizens possess [property], as little as it may 
be, and by this possession […], they place themselves above the economic fatalities that are inherent 
to the proletariat, the income tax should once again become rigorously proportional, since all increases 
would fall, not upon inheritances, but upon capital and thus would discourage saving.‖ (ibid.: 54). 
32
 Léon Say organized again in 1891 a discussion on this question; the question asked was: ―Is the tax 
a mean to share out the wealth among citizens?‖  
33
 Reference was made to the ―theory of minimum‖ (Chailley-Bert, 1884: 417) or the ―maxim of 
minimum need or of the minimum for existence‖ (Leroy-Beaulieu, 1879: 163). As Leroy-Beaulieu 
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(ibid.) pointed out, this exemption nonetheless had an arbitrary component, since it supposed the 
definition of ―minimum need‖.  
34
 This observation was not, however, the subject of consensus among the liberals. For example, 
Rondelet (1860: 309-310) considered that the rich were ―invited‖ to make a ―voluntary increase in 
[their] contribution […] by indirect taxes‖, and that this was ―one of the conditions of [their] luxury 
and one of the burdens of [their] fortunes‖. 
35
 Although he considered that ―exempting low revenues […] constitutes a mode of progression‖, Say 
(1886: 178) nonetheless justified the exemption for ―countries where there is a financial legislation 
that is unfavorable to low revenues[, for example] when indirect taxes weigh on goods of primary 
necessity‖. See also Passy (1852: 273). 
36
 The relationship between the insurance perspective of taxes and the proportionality rule was far 
from obvious. Thus, though sharing this perspective, Garnier (1862) pronounced himself in favor of a 
―moderate‖ progressivity rule, which he called a ―rational progressive tax‖ as opposed to the ―absurd 
progressive‖ tax defended by those who, in his opinion, were opposed to property and wanted a 
―leveling of conditions‖ (ibid. : 82). He justified his position by the idea of an equivalence between the 
tax paid by an individual and ―the value of the security that is guaranteed him [by the society]‖ (Ibid.: 
84). In the same way, Fauveau (1864)—who felt that the risk of damage (i.e., a theft) was higher for a 
rich person than for a poor person—fought for the progressivity of the tax system. On these questions, 
see Silvant (2007).  
37
 Though Bentham's position was used to show how a legalistic conception of property rights led to a 
principle of tax progressivity, Mill's position was regularly cited by French liberals to defend their 
position on tax proportionality. (see for example Leroy-Beaulieu, 1879: 136; Stourm, 1893: 233-34).  
38
 One should notice here that such a conception was shared by Bentham: in his Manuel d’économie 
politique, he justified a fiscal policy aiming at ―increasing the price [of liquors and spirits], so that 
their consumption would be limited by their dearness‖. 
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39
 In reality, the debate led the participants to develop arguments that were, in some cases, close to 
those of Dupuit. Practically only Courtois (in Société d‘économie politique, 1859b: 472) opposed a 
heavier tax on tobacco, which he described as a ―crying injustice‖.  
40
 In the same way, as underlined by Breton (1985: 251) referring to Ricardian theory, ―wishing to 
save the threatened social order, some [liberals] (Dunoyer, Bastiat) wrongly criticized Ricardo‘s value 
and rent theories for the simple reason that these theories questioned their ‗natural harmonies‘ and the 
sanctified private property.‖ 
